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ty ’s	evolving	position	regarding	Russo - Japanese	 territorial	dispute,	commonly	known	as	 the	
“Northern	Territories”	issue.		Positions	concerning	the	contested	islands	range	are	being	disput-
ed	not	only	between	Japan	and	Russia	but	between	Japan ’s	major	political	parties	as	well.	












































8  Komei Shimbun. 22 September 1967.
9  Ibid.
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The	meeting	was	 immediately	preceded	by	a	visit	 to	Hokkaido	of	 the	Komeito ’s	Vice	Secre-
tary -General,	Watanabe	Ichiro,	member	of	 the	Lower	House	“Special	Committee	on	Okinawa	
and	Other	Issues”,	who	went	there	with	a	group	of	other	Diet	members	to	examine	views	of	the	






















12  Komei Shimbun. 22 September 1967.
13		Komeito	made	public	the	party’s	conception	in	its	journal	in	October	1967.	See	footnote	11	above.
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The	Komeito ’s	primary	ever	published	documents	 on	 the	 ‘Northern	Territories ’	were	 the	
“Komeito’s	Claims	concerning	the	Northern	Territories”	[ 北方領土の関する公明党の主張]	and	
the	“Road	to	the	Return	of	the	Northern	Territories	[ 北方領土返還への道].21	The	“Claims”	was	






























The	“Kurile	 islands ”	were	specifically	defined	as	corresponding	to	 the	“Middle	and	Northern	

























57Lack of Consensus over the Disputed ‘Kurile Islands’ Range : ‘Kuriles’ as a Part of ‘Chishimas’
lateral	agreement	provided	a	powerful	stimulus	to	the	formation	of	the	Komeito’s	initial	position	



















tially	“ subjected	to	aggression	 from	Russia,”	 later	“ returned”	to	Japan	following	1875	Russo—






























lated	only	 in	 the	 text	of	 the	Yalta	Agreement,	 Japan,	which	had	not	 taken	part	 in	 the	Yalta	

















The	 “Road ”	also	suggested	demanding	 immediate	withdrawal	of	 the	Soviet	 troops	 from	the	
“Habomais,	Shikotan,	Kunashiri	and	Etorofu	zone, ”	referring	to	the	alleged	fact	that	 following	
provisions	of	 the	1956	Joint	Soviet - Japanese	Declaration,	 “ the	wartime	occupation	ended. ”	Be-
sides,	concerning	the	“Kurile	Islands,”	authors	of	the	“Road”	considered	it	appropriate	to	address	
the	 issue	after	concluding	 the	 trilateral	 consultations	and	request	 that	 these	 islands	should	
achieve	the	status	of	the	U.N.	trusteeship	territory	administered	by	Japan,	or	be	recognized	as	
transferred	under	Japan’s	sovereignty.36	
Even	though	 inclusion	of	 the	trilateral	consultations	project	 into	a	political	party ’s	action	pro-
gram	was	rather	innovative,	such	a	scheme	was	hardly	unique	as	it	applied	to	the	territorial	is-
sue.	Thus,	while	on	a	visit	to	Japan,	on	September	15,	1967,	the	U.S.	Senator	Michael	Mansfield	










per	House	Komeito	deputy,	Kuroyanagi	Akira,	 cited	 two	reasons	why	the	Okinawa	and	 the	
‘Northern	Territories’	issues	could	not	be	“mixed”:	firstly,	he	warned	that	it	could	be	impossible	
to	resolve	the	Okinawa	issue	before	finding	a	resolution	of	the	‘Northern	Territories’	issue	and,	
secondly,	he	 foresaw	various	complications	related	to	the	Soviet	Union ’s	 interference	 in	a	“ so-
35		Ibid,	p.45.
36		Ibid,	pp.	45 - 46.












gotiations ”;	 thirdly,	 the	 islands	to	the	north	of	Uruppu	 inclusive	were	defined	as	“ immemorial	
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lated	in	anticipation	of	the	intensification	of	bilateral	negotiations,	which	was	pointed	out	in	the	














































1951,	when	he	delivered	a	speech	as	Japan ’s	Ambassador	Plenipotentiary.	According	 to	 the	
“Road”,	the	former	Prime	Minister,	while	having	clearly	defined	the	status	of	the	Habomais	and	
Shikotan,	at	the	same	time	failed	to	appreciate	and	let	the	audience	know	the	importance	of	a	
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The	 inability	of	 the	Japanese	government	 to	explain	adequately	why	Kunashiri	and	Etorofu	
52		Komei	（journal）.	December	1967,	No.	62,	p.	44.





































High	anxiety	about	 the	 ‘Chishimas ’	 —	 ‘Kuriles ’	discrepancy	made	 itself	known	at	 the	 initial	
stage	of	the	‘Northern	territories’	issue	evolution.	Thus,	addressing	the	government	during	the	
57	 	 For	 a	 full	 text	 see	 https://www.ne.jp/asahi/cccp/camera/HoppouRyoudo/HoppouShiry-
ou/19640617Tsuutatsu.htm	（Accessed	on	December	1,	2020）
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Shimazu	Hisahiro,	apparently	 identifying	the	terms ’	Kurile	 Islands ’	and	 ‘Chishima	Islands ’	as	
standing	for	the	same	group	of	islands,	commented	that	provisions	of	the	Yalta	Agreement	had	
not	specified	the	exact	range	of	the	“so -called	Chishima	islands”	and	that	it	was	impossible	to	






































Northern	Chishimas	and	the	Southern	Chishimas,	clarifying	 further	 that	 the	 term	“Southern	
Chishimas”	implied	Kunashiri	and	Etorofu.66	
			

















the	two	terms	remain	different,	particularly	against	 the	background	of	 the	Foreign	Ministry ’s	
Circular	Note	of	June	1964,	makes	up	a	highly	unique	feature	of	the	Komeito’s	position	regarding	
the	‘Northern	Territories’	issue.	At	the	same	time,	this	choice	has	uniquely	contributed	to	a	re-
markable	 lack	of	consensus	among	Japanese	political	parties	concerning	the	territorial	 issue	in	
question.	
